Against this tradition I will argue that the whole of the Critique is largely a negative-destructive enterprise. Commentators commonly distinguish between Kant’s Positive Project (PP), that is, his epistemology as laid out in the Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic, from his Negative Project (NP), expressed in terms of the destructive implications his epistemology has on speculative metaphysics and rational theology. The Critique of Pure Reason inaugurated Kant’s Critical Philosophy. I endeavor to concentrate on the issue whichindicatesKant uses outer thing in refutation of idealism in edition B as object of experience not as thing in itself.Meanwhile, I rebutGuyer'sargumentandadduce my own reasons point-by-point in order to defend Kant's idealism. She also shows refutation of idealism can attain its goal and it does not thus fail that is, it can rebut problematic idealism. Dina Emundts (2010) shows, as opposed to Guyer'sclaim, Kant has located refutation of idealism in the right place, namely after analogies of experience in edition B. I shall show Kant's refutation of idealism does not involve any knowledge ofthing in itself as opposed to Guyer'sreading rather,Kantuses outer thing asan object of experience, that is, outer things are experience-sensations under application of categories.Some scholars such as Allison (2004) have defended Kant's idealism. In this paper I will try to refute Guyer's reading of Kant's refutation of idealismin a way in which I defend Kant'sidealism which has been denied by Guyer.By the notion of idealismaccording to Kant's philosophyI mean we are not allowed touse space referring to thing in itself, as opposed to Guyer'sclaim.In other wordsaccording to Kantobjects of experienceare objectively constructed by subject based upon lawful connection betweenthem, as he expresses in the first analogy of experience,overlooking what they are really in themselves as mind-independent reality.

I explain how this provides Kant with a powerful motivation and reason for denying the so-called ‘neglected alternative’, and conclude by suggesting that the nature of any theological response to Kant will depend upon some fundamental options about how to conceive of the relationship between the creator and creation. I show that Kant has significant theological difficulties ascribing such transcendental freedom to creatures in relation to God, and that he intends transcendental idealism to be a solution to these difficulties.

Kant makes this shift in order to protect the possibility of transcedental freedom. Creative tasks carried out by the divine mind in the pre-critical works become assigned to the human noumenal mind, which is conceived of as the (created) source of space, time and causation.

Without denying the importance of a range of independent epistemic and metaphysical considerations, I argue that there is an irreducibly theological dimension to the emergence of Kant’s transcendental idealism.

Kant critique of pure reason cambridge